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I. INTRODUCTION
On April 28, 2009, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Forest
Grove School District v. T.A.,1 a case that addresses a deeply contested issue
in special education litigation. Reviewing the Ninth Circuit’s decision in
Forest Grove, the Court will decide whether the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA)2 entitles parents to reimbursement for their
child’s private school education if the child has never received special education services provided by a public school.3 Forest Grove represents the
latest of many cases to perpetuate the circuit split on this issue. In fact, in
2007, the Supreme Court addressed the same question in Board of Education v. Tom F.4 Just two weeks before the Court heard argument in Tom F.,
however, Justice Kennedy recused himself,5 resulting in a 4-4, nonprecedential decision affirming the Second Circuit’s grant of reimbursement
to parents facing circumstances similar to those presented in Forest Grove.6
Currently, the Second,7 Ninth,8 and Eleventh Circuits9 recognize the availa-

* J.D., Northwestern University School of Law, 2009; B.A., Duke University, 2005. Thanks to Hillary Coustan, Scott Lerner, Dave Baltmanis, and the Colloquy Board.
1
Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 987 (2009) (No. 08-305) (argued Apr.
28, 2009), decision below at Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 523 F.3d 1078 (9th Cir. 2008) (link).
2
20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1482 (2006) (link).
3
It is a settled question that the IDEA entitles parents to reimbursement for their child’s private
school tuition if the public school cannot or will not provide the child with an appropriate public education. Burlington Sch. Comm. v. Dep’t of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 369 (1985) (link).
4
128 S. Ct. 1 (2007) (mem.) (link).
5
Tony Mauro, Will Justice Kennedy Recuse Again?, LAW.COM, Oct. 21, 2008,
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202425400784 (link).
6
Id.; see Bd. of Educ. v. Tom F. ex rel. Gilbert F., 193 Fed. App’x. 26 (2d Cir. 2006).
7
Frank G. v. Bd. of Educ., 459 F.3d 356 (2d Cir. 2006) (link).
8
Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 523 F.3d 1078 (9th Cir. 2008) (link).
9
M.M. ex rel. C.M. v. Sch. Bd., 437 F.3d 1085 (11th Cir. 2006) (link).
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bility of reimbursement, while in contrast, the First Circuit10 has refused to
do so.
Because of the growing divide between the circuits, many parents of
children with disabilities face uncertainty about whether they will be reimbursed if they choose to enroll their children in private schools.11 The Supreme Court should end parents’ uncertainty by affirming the Ninth
Circuit’s decision in Forest Grove and holding that parents who enroll their
child in private school before that child has received publicly provided special education services are not precluded from tuition reimbursement under
the IDEA. The language and intent of the IDEA and the balance of policy
considerations support the Ninth Circuit’s decision. More importantly, the
Court should capitalize on its opportunity to refine the judicial approach to
private school reimbursement cases by adopting an analytical framework
that encourages parents and schools to cooperate more closely.
II. BACKGROUND: THE LAW AND FACTS BEHIND FOREST GROVE
SCHOOL DISTRICT V. T.A.
A. Reimbursement for Private School Tuition under the IDEA
Congress enacted the IDEA ―to ensure that all children with disabilities
have available to them a free appropriate public education that emphasizes
special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs. .
. .‖12 The IDEA provides comprehensive procedural safeguards13 and empowers parents as ―equal partners with school personnel in the education of
their children.‖14 Accordingly, the IDEA is structured to encourage parents
to collaborate with school districts in developing Individualized Education
Plans (IEP) that provide the special education services necessary for their
children to receive a free appropriate public education.15 If parents are not
satisfied with the special education services offered to their child, they may
file a complaint to initiate an administrative hearing.16 Parents may appeal
10

Greenland Sch. Dist. v. Amy N., 358 F.3d 150 (1st Cir. 2004) (link).
Last year, nearly half of the parents who enrolled their children in private schools because they
needed special education services did so while facing such uncertainty. Joseph Goldstein, 9 Could Rescue Disabled Pupils: Top Court Takes N.Y. Case on Tuition Reimbursement, NYSUN.COM, Feb. 27,
2007, http://www.nysun.com/new-york/9-could-rescue-disabled-pupils/49334/ (link).
12
20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A) (2006) (link).
13
See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1412(a)(6) , 1415 (2006) (link to § 1412) (link to § 1415); see also Allan G.
Osborne, Jr., Is a Parent Who Places a Child with a Disability in a Private School Entitled to Tuition
Reimbursement if the Child Has Never Attended a Public School? Board of Education of the City of
New York v. Tom F., 219 ED. LAW REP. 887, 887 (2007).
14
Osborne, Jr., supra note 13, at 887; see also 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(B) (2006) (―The purposes of
this chapter are—to ensure that the rights of children with disabilities and parents of such children are
protected.‖).
15
20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(4) (2006).
16
20 U.S.C §§ 1415(b)(6), 1415(f) (2006).
11
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final administrative decisions by bringing a civil action in state or federal
court.17
Because the IDEA did not explicitly address private school tuition
reimbursement before 1997, the Supreme Court found the authority to grant
such reimbursement in the IDEA’s broad ―appropriate‖ relief provision,
§ 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii).18 This sweeping provision empowers courts reviewing
administrative decisions with the discretion ―to grant such relief as the court
determines is appropriate.‖19 In School Committee of Burlington v. Department of Education, the Court interpreted § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii) to ―confer
broad discretion‖20 that authorizes private school tuition reimbursement
when the school district fails to provide a free appropriate public education.21 After noting that judicial review under the IDEA is a ―ponderous,‖
slow process,22 the Court in Burlington stated:
[T]he parents who disagree with the proposed IEP are faced
with a choice: go along with the IEP to the detriment of
their child if it turns out to be inappropriate or pay for what
they consider to be the appropriate placement. If they
choose the latter course, which conscientious parents who
have adequate means and who are reasonably confident of
their assessment normally would, it would be an empty victory to tell them several years later that they were right but
that these expenditures could not in a proper case be reimbursed by the school officials. If that were the case, the
child’s right to a free appropriate public education, the parents’ right to participate fully in developing the proper IEP,
and all of the procedural safeguards would be less than
complete.23
17

20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)–(i) (2006); see also Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondent at 3, Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 129 S.Ct. 987 (2009) (No. 08-305), 2005 WL 870018
(link).
18
Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 523 F.3d 1078, 1085 (9th Cir. 2008); see 20 U.S.C. §
1415(i)(2)(C)(iii) (2006).
19
20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii) (2006).
20
Sch. Comm. of Burlington v. Dep’t of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 369 (1985) (link).
21
Id. at 370; see also Florence County Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 15–16 (1993) (reaffirming the Court’s finding in Burlington that the IDEA authorizes private school reimbursement) (link).
Although Burlington and Carter involved children who had received publicly provided special
education services before their parents enrolled them in private school, neither decision holds that receipt of such services constitutes a prerequisite for tuition reimbursement. Moreover, ―following Burlington, lower courts routinely awarded reimbursement to parents of children who had not previously
received public special education.‖ Brief for the United States, supra note 17, at 14–15.
22
Burlington, 471 U.S. 359, 370 (1985) (―As this case so vividly demonstrates, . . . the review
process is ponderous. A final judicial decision on the merits of an IEP will in most instances come a
year or more after the school term covered by that IEP has passed.‖).
23
Id.
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This pronouncement underpins the Court’s holding in Burlington and
echoes throughout subsequent decisions that confirm courts’ power to grant
tuition reimbursement under the IDEA.24
In 1997, Congress amended the IDEA to address explicitly private
school tuition reimbursement under a new section, entitled ―Payment for
education of children enrolled in private schools without consent of or referral by the public agency.‖25 The following provision of this section includes the statutory language at issue in Forest Grove:
If the parents of a child with a disability, who previously
received special education and related services under the
authority of a public agency, enroll the child in a private
elementary school or secondary school without the consent
of or referral by the public agency, a court or a hearing officer may require the agency to reimburse the parents for
the cost of that enrollment if the court or hearing officer
finds that the agency had not made a free appropriate public
education available to the child in a timely manner prior to
that enrollment.26
Forest Grove presents the question of whether, by adopting the 1997
amendments, Congress barred private school tuition reimbursement for students who have not ―previously received special education and related services.‖27 Or, do ―those students remain eligible for private school
reimbursement, as they were before 1997,‖ under the IDEA’s broad ―appropriate‖ relief provision, § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii)?28 The facts in Forest Grove
provide context for this difficult question.
B. Facts and Procedural History in Forest Grove
After T.A. attended public school from kindergarten until the spring of
his junior year, his parents removed him and placed him in private school.29
Although T.A. ―experienced difficulty paying attention in class,‖ depended
on extensive help from his family to complete his schoolwork, and was evaluated by the school district for a disability, he never received special edu-

24
See, e.g., Carter, 510 U.S. at 12; Frank G. v. Bd. of Educ., 459 F.3d 356, 369 (2d Cir. 2006);
M.M. ex. rel. C.M. v. Sch. Bd., 437 F.3d 1085, 1098–99 (11th Cir. 2006) (link); Greenland Sch. Dist. v.
Amy N., 358 F.3d 150, 158 (1st Cir. 2004).
25
20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C) (2006).
26
Id. (emphasis added).
27
Id.
28
Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 523 F.3d 1078, 1086 (9th Cir. 2008).
29
Id. at 1081.
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cation services while enrolled in public school.30 When school staff members evaluated T.A. during internal meetings that did not involve his
parents, they considered the possibility that T.A. had Attention Deficit
Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD).‖31 Instead of testing him for ADHD,
however, T.A. was formally evaluated for a learning disability, and the
school’s psychologists and educational specialists unanimously concluded
that he had no such disability.32 Accordingly, the school psychologist’s report indicated that T.A. was not eligible for special education services under
the IDEA, though he may have been eligible for accommodations under §
504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.33 The school district never followed
up on either the suggestion that T.A. had ADHD or that he might be eligible
for § 504 accommodations.34 When T.A. continued to experience difficulty
in school, his mother contacted school administrators multiple times expressing her concerns and proposing that the school reevaluate him. 35 The
school district told T.A.’s mother that a subsequent evaluation would not
likely find T.A. eligible for special education services.36 The district offered
no other assistance.37
T.A. continued to fall behind in school and, in 2002, he began using
marijuana and ―exhibit[ing] noticeable personality changes.‖38 In 2003,
T.A. ran away from home and ultimately ended up in a hospital emergency
room.39 His parents then hired a psychologist, who ―diagnosed T.A. with
ADHD, depression, math disorder, and cannabis abuse.‖40 Upon the psychologist’s advice, in March of 2003 T.A.’s parents removed him from public school and ultimately enrolled him in Mount Bachelor Academy, a
private school intended for students with special needs.41 Four days after
placing T.A. in private school, his parents obtained a lawyer who advised
30

Id.
Id. Notes from two separate meetings included: Jan. 16, 2001—―Maybe ADD/ADHD?,‖ and
Feb. 13, 2001—―suspected ADHD.‖ Id.
32
Id.
33
Id. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 is a civil rights statute that broadly prohibits discrimination
against individuals with disabilities. See 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2006) (link). As the IDEA is devoted specifically to students with disabilities, the two statutes provide different, but sometimes overlapping, special education services.
34
Forest Grove, 523 F.3d at 1081
35
See Appellant’s Opening Brief at 37, Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 523 F.3d 1078, 1086 (9th
Cir. 2008) (No. 05-35641); Brief for the United States, supra note 17, at 5. In her e-mail, T.A.’s mother
expressed concern that T.A. ―apparently cannot process information or learn from the teaching methods
used thus far‖ and suggested that ―there must be some method of teaching more appropriate for him.‖
Id. (citation omitted).
36
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 35, at 37.
37
Brief for the United States, supra note 17, at 5.
38
See Forest Grove, 523 F.3d at 1081–82.
39
Id.
40
Id. at 1082.
41
Id.
31
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them to request a hearing under the IDEA and to seek an order commanding
the school to evaluate T.A. for disabilities.42 The team of specialists assembled to evaluate T.A. ―acknowledged T.A.’s learning difficulties, his diagnosis of ADHD, and his depression,‖43 but nonetheless concluded that T.A.
did not qualify for special education services under the IDEA ―because
those diagnoses did not have a severe effect on T.A.’s educational performance.‖44
Following the school district’s evaluation, an administrative hearing
officer concluded that T.A. ―was disabled and therefore eligible for special
education under the IDEA and [§] 504.‖45 The hearing officer further concluded that the school district had failed to provide T.A. a free appropriate
public education, and accordingly was required to reimburse T.A.’s parents
for sending him to Mount Bachelor, which cost $5,200 per month.46 The
District Court reversed, leading T.A.’s parents to appeal to the Ninth Circuit.47 The Ninth Circuit reversed the District Court’s decision and remanded the case for further consideration consistent with its determination
that T.A.’s parents were eligible for private school tuition reimbursement—
despite the fact that T.A. never received special education services while
enrolled in public school.48 Both the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning and wider
policy implications support its decision.
III. WHY THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD AFFIRM FOREST GROVE AND
REFINE THE COURT’S ANALYSIS
A. The Second Circuit Correctly Interpreted the IDEA
In deciding Forest Grove, the Ninth Circuit adopted the Second Circuit’s statutory analysis in Frank G. v. Board of Education,49 a case with
similar facts.50 Because that analysis was sound and firmly rooted in the
text, structure, and history of the IDEA, the Supreme Court should affirm
Forest Grove.
The Second Circuit first determined that § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) is ambiguous because the plain language of the provision ―does not say that tuition
reimbursement is only available to parents whose child had previously re-

42

Id.
Id.
44
Id.
45
Id. at 1082–83.
46
Id.
47
Id. at 1083.
48
Id. at 1088–89.
49
459 F.3d 356 (2d Cir. 2006).
50
Forest Grove, 523 F.3d at 1086 (―We agree with and adopt the analysis and conclusion of the
Second Circuit.‖).
43
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ceived special education and related services from a public agency.‖51 Additionally, the Second Circuit recognized the continuing validity of the
Burlington Court’s finding that the IDEA’s general ―appropriate‖ relief
provision52 confers ―broad discretion‖ that authorizes private school tuition
reimbursement.53 The Court stated that the re-enactment of this provision in
1997, ―without change, is significant because it can be presumed that Congress intended to adopt the construction given to it by the Supreme Court
and made that construction part of the enactment.‖54
Applying ―traditional canons of statutory construction,‖ the Second
Circuit explored the broad purpose of the IDEA and found that the statute
―was intended to give handicapped children both an appropriate education
and a free one; it should not be interpreted to defeat one or the other of
those objectives.‖55
The court then noted that interpreting
§ 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) to bar tuition reimbursement for parents whose child
had not previously received publicly provided special education services
would lead to ―absurd results‖ that involve withholding reimbursement
from parents whose children indeed meet the IDEA’s requirements.56 Finally, the Second Circuit noted that its interpretation converged with both the
position of the Department of Education’s Office of Special Education &
Rehabilitative Services and the statute’s legislative history.57
B. Policy Considerations Supporting the Ninth Circuit’s Decision
Reversing Forest Grove could produce consequences that contravene
the IDEA’s purpose and essentially ―deprive a child of a free and appropriate education when all the fault lay with the public school.‖58 As the Ninth
Circuit recognized, reading § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) as a categorical bar would
require parents of a child with a disability to preserve their right to reimbursement by accepting publicly provided special education services even if
those services are inadequate, and even if the school district fails to coope-

51

Frank G., 459 F.3d at 368 (emphasis in original).
20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii) (2006).
53
Frank G., 459 F.3d at 369–70.
54
Id.
55
Id. at 372 (quoting Sch. Comm. of Burlington v. Dep’t of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 372 (1985)) (internal quotations omitted); see also Forest Grove, 523 F.3d at 1086 (summarizing the Second Circuit’s
reasoning in Frank G.).
56
Frank G., 459 F.3d at 372; Forest Grove, 523 F.3d at 1086. See infra text accompanying notes
58–65 (detailing the absurd results that would follow the reversal of Forest Grove).
57
Frank G., 459 F.3d at 372–73 (―We do not view § 612(a)(10)(C) [20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)] as
foreclosing categorically an award of reimbursement in a case in which a child has not yet been enrolled
in special education and related services under the authority of a public agency.‖ (quoting Letter to Susan Luger, listed in 65 Fed.Reg. 9178 (Feb. 23, 2000) and reprinted in 33 I.D.E.L.R. 126 (Mar. 19,
1999)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
58
Brief for the United States, supra note 17, at 27.
52
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rate with them to formulate an effective IEP.59 The Forest Grove school
district contends that parents should be required merely to ―give the IEP a
try and send their child to public school,‖ even for a very short time period.60 However, requiring enrollment in public school as a prerequisite to
tuition reimbursement could disrupt a child’s education and produce psychologically damaging consequences:
Appropriate education during a child’s formative years is
critical to a child’s development. Moving a child from one
school to another can be highly disruptive to the child, both
educationally and psychologically. That is true for any
youth; it may be especially true for a child with a disability.
It would be absurd to conclude that Congress created a regime whereby parents would have to compound the educational difficulties their children have by subjecting them to
inappropriate schools merely to qualify for tuition reimbursement.61
Even if a child accepts inadequate services while his parents work with
the school district to develop an appropriate IEP, the resulting negotiation
process could last indefinitely. All the while, the child must endure insufficient services that deny him the free appropriate education the IDEA promises.62 The child’s inadequate education may be prolonged still further if
the parents’ negotiations with the district fail and the parents initiate an administrative hearing and eventually appeal to federal court.63
In addition, ―if the school district declined to recognize a student as
disabled—as occurred in [Forest Grove]—the student would never receive
special education in public school and therefore would never be eligible for
reimbursement . . . .‖64 Most cynically, reversing Forest Grove would allow—and even incentivize—school districts to ―avoid any obligation to
reimburse private-school tuition simply by refusing to provide special education and related services themselves—no matter how much a child needs
59

Forest Grove, 523 F.3d at 1087; see also M.M. ex. rel. C.M. v. Sch. Bd., 437 F.3d 1085, 1099
(11th Cir. 2006) (stating that ―the School Board’s disturbing interpretation would . . . place parents . . .
in the untenable position of acquiescing to an inappropriate placement in order to preserve their right to
reimbursement‖ (quoting Justin G. v. Bd. of Educ., 148 F.Supp.2d 576, 587 (D. Md. 2001)) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
60
Transcript of Oral Argument at 12, Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., No. 08-305 (U.S. argued Apr.
28, 2009) (link).
61
Brief for the United States, supra note 17, at 25–26.
62
See Sch. Comm. of Burlington v. Dep’t of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 370 (1985).
63
During oral argument, Justice Souter seemed especially concerned that litigation could ―go on for
years‖ while the student languishes in an improper educational placement. Transcript of Oral Argument,
supra note 60, at 8.
64
Forest Grove, 523 F.3d at 1087 (emphasis in original).
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those services and is entitled to them under IDEA.‖65 During oral argument,
Justice Stevens suggested that, under the school district’s approach, by
adamantly denying that a student is eligible for special education services, a
school district may permanently shield itself from liability for tuition reimbursement.66
Some commentators have argued that policy implications in fact militate against affirming Forest Grove. These commentators fear that Forest
Grove may increase school districts’ costs because the districts would be
required both to defend against increased litigation by parents and to pay
for the private school tuition of an increasing number of students.67 But as
Justice O’Connor stated in Florence County School District Four v. Carter:
There is no doubt that Congress has imposed a significant
financial burden on States and school districts that participate in IDEA. Yet public educational authorities who want
to avoid reimbursing parents for the private education of a
disabled child can do one of two things: give the child a
free appropriate public education in a public setting, or
place the child in an appropriate private setting of the
State’s choice. This is IDEA’s mandate, and school officials who conform to it need not worry about reimbursement claims.68
Under the IDEA, a school district is not liable for the cost of private
special education services if it affords a child a free appropriate public education.69 Accordingly, the simplest and cheapest way for school districts to
avoid the cost of private school tuition reimbursement is by providing children in need of special education services with a free appropriate education
in the first place. However, if school districts fail to do so, parents must be
able to turn to effective administrative and judicial procedures to ensure that
their child ultimately receives the education that the IDEA guarantees.

65

Brief for the United States, supra note 17, at 17.
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 60, at 17–18. Justice Stevens later asked Forest Grove’s
lawyer, ―Doesn’t your interpretation of the statute create an incentive for the school board to just say,
we’ll never provide any kind of . . . special education, we will just tough it out? Because they can’t lose,
they can’t be liable if they do that . . . .‖ Id. at 19.
67
See John W. Borkowski, The 2006–2007 Term of the United States Supreme Court and Its Impact
on Public Schools, 223 ED. LAW REP. 481, 510 (2007) (link).
68
510 U.S. 7, 15 (1993) (link).
69
20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(i) (2006).
66
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C. An Opportunity to Refine the Approach of Lower Courts to Evaluating
Parents’ Cooperation with the School District
In addition to realizing Congress’s intent and furthering the IDEA’s
policies, affirming Forest Grove would allow the Supreme Court to correct
the approach of lower courts to implementing a crucial goal of the IDEA—
promoting cooperation between parents and the school district. Careful examination of the facts in previous cases reveals that tuition reimbursement
decisions frequently hinge on the level of cooperation between parents and
the school district, and as a corollary, the extent to which parents provide
notice before placing their child in private school. The more vociferously
parents alert the school district before removing their child, the greater the
chance that courts will refuse to read § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) as a categorical
bar to private school tuition reimbursement.70
This observation suggests that the Supreme Court may affirm the Ninth
Circuit’s decision in Forest Grove because of T.A.’s parents’ persistent
communication with the school district. However, while the Supreme
Court should indeed affirm Forest Grove, it should also refine the analysis
that leads to this result. Instead of allowing the parents’ cooperation with
the school district to implicitly inform courts’ interpretations of
§ 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii), the Supreme Court should instruct lower courts to analyze parental cooperation under the separate provision designed for this
purpose—§ 1412(a)(10)(C)(iii). This provision, entitled ―Limitation on
reimbursement,‖ allows courts to reduce or deny the amount of reimbursement if parents fail to inform the district that they intend to reject its proposed special education services before removing their child from public
school.71 By considering parents’ cooperation under this provision, the
Court would implement the IDEA’s goal of encouraging collaboration between parents and the district, while avoiding the unintended consequences
that may accompany a total bar on tuition reimbursement in cases where the
child has not first received publicly provided special education services.
Undeniably, one of the central objectives of the IDEA is to promote
cooperation between parents and the school district as a means to ensure
that each child in need of special education services receives a free appropriate public education. The First Circuit’s pursuit of this objective largely
determined its decision to read § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) as a bar to reimbursement for parents who never notified the school district before removing
their child from public school.72 According to the First Circuit, the statute
―serves the important purpose of giving the school system an opportunity,
before the child is removed, to assemble a team, evaluate the child, devise
an appropriate plan, and determine whether a free appropriate public educa70
See, e.g., Forest Grove, 523 F.3d 1078; M.M. ex. rel. C.M., 437 F.3d 1085 (11th Cir. 2006);
Frank G. v. Bd. of Educ., 459 F.3d 356 (2d Cir. 2006).
71
20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(iii)(I)(aa) (2006).
72
Greenland Sch. Dist. v. Amy N., 358 F.3d 150 (2004).
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tion can be provided in the public schools.‖73 Some commentators have argued that this interpretation will induce parents to cooperate with school
districts rather than prematurely transferring their children to private
schools.74
Close examination of the facts in each circuit court case demonstrates
that courts rely heavily on the level of cooperation between parents and
school districts in reaching their decisions. In contrast to the majority of
circuit courts, the First Circuit, in Greenland School District v. Amy N., read
§ 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) as categorically barring private school tuition reimbursement when a child has never received publicly provided special education services.75 The Greenland court’s anomalous decision, however, may
best be explained by distinguishing between the facts of that case and the
facts of cases in other circuits. In Greenland, the parents transferred their
daughter to private school before ever notifying her public school that she
needed special education services.76 The parents first requested that the
school district evaluate their daughter for special education services approximately one year after they removed her from public school.77 Stating that
―[t]he point is that there was no notice at all to the school system before Katie’s removal from Greenland that there was any issue about whether Katie
was in need of special education services,‖ the First Circuit denied the parents tuition reimbursement.78
In contrast to the First Circuit, the Second, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have all read § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) to allow tuition reimbursement even
if a child has never received public special education services. In the cases
addressed by each of those circuits, however, the parents had communicated
with the school district about their child’s special education needs in a more
active, timely way than had the parents in Greenland.79 Indeed, the Second
Circuit explicitly recognized this distinction and noted that unlike the parents in Greenland, the parents in Frank G. had provided extensive notice

73

Id. at 160.
See Borkowski, supra note 67, 510.
75
Greenland, 358 F.3d at 159-60.
76
Greenland, 358 F.3d at 152–53 (―At no point during [the child’s] time at Greenland did her parents or any of her teachers request that she be evaluated for special education services.‖) However, arguably, the school district had adequate notice that the child needed special education services as her
parents informed the school that she had been diagnosed with ADHD, her second, third, and fourth
grade teachers all employed techniques suggested by her psychiatrist to keep her on task, and her mother, a special education teacher, spent a great deal of time helping her daughter with her homework each
night. Id.
77
Id. At this point, in May of 2001, the school district found the child ineligible for special education services, though the district eventually reversed its determination in November of 2001 after reviewing the diagnosis of the child’s private psychiatrist. Id.
78
Id. at 160.
79
See, e.g., Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 523 F.3d 1078 (9th Cir. 2008); M.M. ex. rel. C.M. v.
Sch. Bd., 437 F.3d 1085 (11th Cir. 2006); Frank G. v. Bd. of Educ., 459 F.3d 356 (2d Cir. 2006).
74
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before removing their child from public school.80 Similarly, the Eleventh
Circuit held that ―reliance on the fact that [the child] never attended public
school is legally insufficient to deny reimbursement under
§ 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii)‖81 where his parents had engaged in extensive negotiations with the school district over the child’s IEP both before they removed
him from public school and while he attended private school.82
T.A.’s parents’ communication with the school district in Forest Grove
aligns his case with those in which courts have granted tuition reimbursement.83 In addition, when it remanded Forest Grove, the Ninth Circuit appropriately instructed the lower court to consider T.A.’s parents’ notice to
the school district as one of the relevant factors used to determine whether
to grant reimbursement and how much reimbursement to grant.84 Consistent with the Ninth Circuit’s instruction, the IDEA directs courts addressing
reimbursement cases to evaluate the extent of notice parents provide the
school district when they are dissatisfied with their child’s IEP.85 However,
the circuit courts have inappropriately allowed their consideration of parents’ notice, and parents’ general cooperation with school districts, to influence their interpretation of the language in § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii). When
reviewing Forest Grove, the Supreme Court should correct this approach by
instructing courts to confine their analysis of parental notice to the provision intended by Congress—the limitation on reimbursement in
§ 1412(a)(10)(C)(iii).
If the Court states definitively that § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) does not create
a categorical bar to private school tuition reimbursement, lower courts will
be left considering parents’ cooperation with school districts under only
§ 1412(a)(10)(C)(iii). In Frank G., the Second Circuit hinted at this improved analysis when it rejected the Greenland court’s interpretation of
§ 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) as unnecessary because § 1412(a)(10)(C)(iii) ―makes
clear Congress’s intent that before parents place their child in private
school, they must at least give notice to the school that special education is
80

Frank G., 459 F.3d at 376.
M.M., 437 F.3d 1085, 1098.
82
Id. at 1090–93. Although the Eleventh Circuit decided the legal sufficiency of private school tuition reimbursement for parents whose child never received publicly provided special education services,
the court noted that C.M. actually had received publicly provided special education services within the
meaning of § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii). Id. at 1098. The court ultimately denied reimbursement in this case
because the school board had offered the student a free appropriate education, albeit not in the form preferred by C.M.’s parents. Id. at 1103.
83
See supra notes 31–37 and accompanying text. In contrast to Greenland, where parents with a
background in special education waited more than a year to notify the school district, T.A.’s parents
provided formal notice to the district within one month of T.A.’s enrollment in the private school, upon
hiring a lawyer. See Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 36, at 45–46.
84
See Forest Grove, 523 F.3d at 1088–89. Other factors suggested by the court include the existence of more appropriate alternative placements, the parents’ effort to secure such placements, and the
school district’s level of cooperation. Id. at 1089.
85
20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(iii)(I)(aa) (2006).
81
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at issue.‖86 The First Circuit’s alternative, clumsier approach to this policy—reading § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) as a categorical bar to tuition reimbursement for parents whose children never received special education services
from their school districts—results in the denial of tuition reimbursement to
parents whose children indeed meet the IDEA’s requirements.87
One might argue that § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) provides the threshold criterion for private school tuition reimbursement—previous receipt of publicly
provided special education services—and that § 1412(a)(10)(C)(iii) further
qualifies the right to reimbursement for parents who satisfy the initial requirement. But this interpretation conflicts with the broader scheme that
Congress endorsed and refined when it drafted the 1997 amendments to the
IDEA, and it would bring about results that undermine the IDEA’s
mandate: to provide a free appropriate public education to all children with
disabilities. Most notably, if a school district fails to detect a child’s disability or refuses to provide special education services, that child’s parents
could not be reimbursed for the cost of their only practical recourse—
private school.88 The more refined statutory analysis suggested by this Essay avoids such inequitable results and better reflects Congress’s intent.
Moreover, this approach improves transparency in judicial decisionmaking
by inviting courts to analyze parental cooperation under the statutory provision that plainly anticipates such consideration.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s review of Forest Grove presents an important
opportunity to advance special education law while resolving the prevailing
uncertainty about the availability of tuition reimbursement for children who
have never received publicly provided special education services. The intent of the IDEA and weight of the policy implications support the Ninth
Circuit’s decision in Forest Grove. More importantly, the Court should refine the approach to tuition reimbursement cases by confining courts’ evaluation of parental cooperation to the appropriate, congressionally intended
statutory provision. In the last two special education cases it reviewed,
Winkelman v. Parma City School District89 and Board of Education of the
City of New York v. Tom F.,90 the Court recognized the important role parents play in ensuring that their children receive the free appropriate public

86

Frank G. v. Bd. of Educ., 459 F.3d 356, 376 (2d Cir. 2006) (citing Greenland Sch. Dist. v. Amy
N., 358 F.3d 150, 160 (1st Cir. 2004)) (emphasis in original) (internal quotations omitted). Although the
Second Circuit disagreed with the Greenland court’s analysis, it agreed with that court’s result. Id. at
375–76.
87
See supra text accompanying notes 58–65.
88
See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
89
127 S. Ct. 1994 (2007) (link).
90
127 S. Ct. 1393 (2007) (link).
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education mandated by the IDEA.91 When deciding Forest Grove, the
Court has the opportunity to solidify this interpretation of the IDEA by affirming the Ninth Circuit’s decision and advancing a more explicit, transparent approach to evaluating parents’ collaboration with the school district.

91
For instance, the Court reached its decision in Winkelman after searching the overall statutory
framework of the IDEA and finding that the statute implicitly grants parents ―independent, enforceable
rights.‖ 127 S. Ct. at 1999.
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